This paper examines Lionel Robbins' critical attitude towards formal empirical work from the standpoint of modern econometrics. It argues that his attitude towards empirical work rested on indefensible assumptions and that he failed to realise that the role he saw for empirical work undermined his belief in the primacy of economic theory. This matters because Robbins' attitudes are echoed in modern economics, best exemplified by the calibration methodology of Kydland and Prescott, which is vulnerable to similar criticisms.
INTRODUCTION
Economists take widely different positions on the role that empirical evidence should play in the development of substantive propositions. Contemporary macroeconomics is split between those who give primacy to theory, whether they employ calibration methods to link theory to data (Edward Prescott) or regard theory and econometrics as complementary (Lars Hansen and Thomas Sargent) , and those who regard atheoretical analyses as fundamental (Christopher Sims).
1 Similar disagreements exist within microeconomics. On the microeconometrics side, one finds competing paradigms between James Heckman, whose work focuses on the use of economic assumptions to account for self-selection and heterogeneity, those who adopt the essentially statistical assumptions employed in Donald Rubin's causal model, and Charles Manski's emphasis on asking what may be learned under minimal assumptions of any type. Other microeconomic research, for example Steven Levitt's work on crime, focuses on the identification of natural experiments, so that econometric analysis is reduced to a trivial role. This variety of views reflects differences of opinion that have persisted throughout the twentieth century, periodically erupting into open controversy. Examples of such controversies include the debate between John Maynard Keynes and Jan Tinbergen in 1939 and on the use of time series methods to understand business cycles, 2 and the debate between Tjalling Koopmans and Rutledge Vining in the late 1940s over the different methods employed at the Cowles Commission and the National Bureau. The discussion of the role of empirical analysis in Lionel Robbins' An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (1932 Science ( , 1935 Science ( , 1984 , hereafter Essay I, II and III) should be seen in this context, as perhaps the most celebrated effort to reject any fundamental role for statistical methods as a source of economic knowledge.
In this paper, we explore Robbins' critical attitude to formal empirical work from the perspective of contemporary economics. Our analysis begins by analysing his discussion, in his Essay, of three main issues. The first issue concerns his statements about the relationship between economic theory and empirical evidence. Here, it is important to take into account the modifications between editions, since it has been claimed that he significantly modified his views. Second, we explore the way in which Robbins' view of the world was such as to lead to the conclusion, whether in his own work or in the mind of those who subsequently read his writings, that statistical methods, such as form the foundation of modern econometrics, are not applicable to the economic world. Third, we investigate the main empirical claims that Robbins made in his Essay, asking how far these are compatible with his professed views on the roles of theory and evidence. We then turn to modern economics, and evaluate how Robbins' abstract claims are reflected in contemporary disagreements, with a focus on how Robbins' belief in the primacy of theory is echoed in the use of calibration in macroeconomics. The contemporary relevance of Robbins-type views on the primacy of theory is interpreted from the perspective of econometric identification problems. Finally, we draw conclusions about the main features of Robbins' view of the world that caused him to articulate a position so hostile to the development of econometrics. While we are critical of Robbins' views on empirical analysis, we emphasize that our assessment is informed by knowledge of recent developments in econometrics. Indeed, the force of our assessment derives from these recent developments. It follows that, to the extent that his views are not correct, this reflects progress in economics of the type of which Robbins might well have approved.
Before turning to Robbins' views, it is useful to remember the context against which they were written.
3 Econometrics, as the term is now understood, was in its infancy. Though there had been earlier attempts to struggle with it, it was not until the 1920s that economists were, by the standards of modern econometrics, beginning to sort out the identification problem. The statistical foundations for aggregate relationships, where there was no sampling, were not yet worked out. There was no systematic framework for the national accounts, and the availability of data was very limited. Not only were the principles of statistical inference only just being worked out (the work of Neymann and Pearson on hypothesis testing was only just beginning to appear), but also the high cost of computation meant that the range of calculations that could be performed would have been very limited. Furthermore, some of the most prominent advocates of empirical work on business cycles were overtly hostile to neoclassical theory. The Harvard 'barometer' sought to dispense with theory, and Wesley Mitchell's eclecticism as regards theory was in practice the prelude to statistical descriptions of the cycle that were hard to relate to theory. Econometrics had not yet reached a stage where economists were seriously trying to test theories, or had the means to do so: it was hard to go beyond the stage of trying to construct a satisfactory empirical model.
I. ROBBINS ON THEORY AND STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
Robbins stated that empirical work was very important. However, despite such statements, the role he conceded for it was very limited indeed. He falls squarely at the latter end of the spectrum ranging from data-driven econometrics to the use of models where data does no more than calibrate theoretical models whose grounds are not questioned. His hostility to 'quantitative economics', which he treated as virtually synonymous with institutionalism and historicism, 4 was so profound that he never took it seriously. Economic theoryFor analytical economics, as he chose to call itFwas what mattered. There was some softening of his language in the second edition, but his position towards empirical work was substantially unchanged. The most significant point is that he failed to see any significant position intermediate between establishing rough estimates of parameters, such as elasticities, that could be done very easily and were largely ephemeral, and parameters that could be established permanently, for all time. The latter category, he claimed, was empty, leaving no role for what would now be considered serious econometric work, namely establishing estimates that might be robust for periods of time that were long enough to be useful.
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In the first edition of the Essay, Robbins emphasized that the propositions of economic theory were 'purely formal in character' and hence known with certainty (I, p. 98; cf. p. 109, twice) . 6 They were logical deductions of the form 'if . . . then' and were as certain as the logic on which they were based. In the second edition, he removed reference to the formal character of theory, arguing that the belief that economics 'is a mere system of formal inferences having no necessary relation to reality, is based upon misconception' (I, p. 104).
7 Instead, he referred to theory being 'general' (II, pp. 121, 122) . It was related to reality by virtue of the fact that the premises were known to apply to the world ('the fundamental generalizations are known to us by immediate acquaintance') rather than inferentially, as in the natural sciences (II, p. 105). However, for this change to make sense, his conception of theory needs to have changed: if theory were simply 'if . . . then' statements, it could still be described as formal. To justify the new terminology, he needs to conceive theory as comprising both factual statements about the world and 'if . . . then' deductions.
Robbins believed that the basic, indisputable premise of economics was scarcity, from which much could be deduced. This is what gives such force to his arguments. Yet he acknowledges that while the general fact of scarcity is unchallengeable, there may not be scarcity of particular commodities. It may thus be necessary to establish whether the theory is applicable to a specific market or a specific problem (I, p. 98). Here it is interesting to see where he goes. One possibility would be to argue in favour of developing an economic theory that applied where scarcity was not applicable, perhaps even a quantitative theory. However, he rejects this categorically as taking analysis outside the realms of 'pure economics'. Yet nowhere does he acknowledge that if theory is seen as a series of claims about reality, this means that the propositions of theory may not have universal application. So, perhaps, despite changing the language in which he described theory from 'formal' to 'general', he still conceived it in the same way.
The principal reason for his narrowing economics to such theory was his belief that the determination of preferences lay outside the point of view of economic analysisFthe 'irrational element in our universe of discourse ' (I, p. 98) . A few pages later he wrote that to pretend that we might explain tastes or technology 'is just pseudo-scientific bravado' (I, p. 109) . This dogmatic exclusion of phenomena such as advertising (which changes individual valuations) and technological progress from the sphere of economics is so remarkable as to be worth emphasis. It is interesting that if data appear to contradict this (for example, someone claims to be able to show that advertising can change preferences), it means that the investigator has not got to the underlying preference system; Robbins' position was that the demand curve should be 'derived from the more fundamental indifference system, and it is to this latter that our position relates' (II, p. 126). 8 What, then, of the role of empirical work? He claimed, emphatically, that economists could not ignore empirical studies and that those economists who had contributed most to economic science had attached great importance to such work. It was needed to determine the applicability of theory and it could indicate areas where economic theory needed to be reformulated and extended (I, pp. 106, 107) . He also argued that empirical work could also perform a negative function, in the service of theory: bringing to light 'the changing facts which make prediction in any given situation impossible' (I, p. 111). These points were repeated in the second edition (II, pp. 116, 120, 123) but with the additional point that data might suggest 'auxiliary postulates' for economic theory (II, p. 116) . Such remarks suggest a conventional position, reminiscent of Mill's methodology, in which empirical work is crucial to the application of theory. However, that is hard to reconcile with the bald statement that 'theory and theory alone' provides the solution (I, p. 109). The remark about 'auxiliary postulates' is also interesting because, if taken seriously, it would imply a dramatic weakening of his position, for it would imply that theory is based not simply on self-evident postulates but also on postulates that have an empirical basis. Theory would be dependent on observation. The scope for observation might fall far short of what Wesley Mitchell and the Institutionalists were calling for, but it would have established the principle that theory might be based on empiricallygrounded postulates. Robbins thus believes that empirical work needs to play a role yet does not consider that this role undermines the strong claims that he is making for economic theory. One way to reconcile this seeming inconsistency is that Robbins believed that there exist aspects of economic theory whose validity can be established by a priori reasoning and others which are ultimately data-dependent.
This view of Robbins appears consistent with his discussion of business cycles. Empirical workers, including his beˆte noir, Mitchell, had sought to uncover empirical generalizations about the cycle but had failed disastrously. In his first edition, Robbins conceded that:
Pure equilibrium theory . . . does not provide any explanation of the phenomena of booms and slumps . . . it does not explain the existence within the economic system of tendencies conducive to disproportionate development. It does not explain discrepancies between total supply and total demand in the sense in which these terms are used in the celebrated Law of Markets.
(I, p. 108)
Yet he sees the value of empirical work as doing no more than pointing to the limitations of economic theory:
It was not until there arose men who were prepared to undertake the entirely different task of starting where equilibrium analysis leaves off and deriving from the categories of pure theory an explanation of fluctuation which is compatible with the assumptions of that analysis, that progress began to be made. There can be no better example of the correct relationship between the two branches of study. Realistic studies may suggest the problem to be solved. They may test the range of applicability of the answer when it is forthcoming. But it is theory and theory alone which is capable of supplying the solution. Any attempt to reverse the relationship must lead inevitably to the nirvana of purposeless observation and record.
(I, p. 109; cf. II, pp. 120-1) 9 Robbins' attitude towards empirical work is also reflected in the extremely high standards by which he expected it to be judged. He criticized quantitative economists for failing to provide 'permanent and substantial' counterparts to the categories of pure analysis (I, p. 109, emphasis added). One example to which he repeatedly turned was the claim by a fictitious Dr Blank, in 1907, that the elasticity of demand for herring was 1.3.
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He was ridiculing the idea that the observation of a particular market at a particular time and place could have 'permanent significance' save as history (I, p. 100). Anyone concerned with policy would use more recent data. He was equally scathing about Mitchell's attempt to derive empirical generalizations about the business cycle, even though one might have thought that evidence that, for example, strong booms tended to be followed by deep depressions might have been a fact that he would have found useful, given his interest in Hayek's business cycle theory. Yet Mitchell's attempt to provide a statistical analysis of the link between cycle length and a logarithmic normal curve fitted to the frequency distribution of the 166 observations is not simply criticized, it is ridiculed: Professor Mitchell . . . apparently thinks that, by taking them together and fitting a highly complicated curve to their frequency distribution, he is constructing something significantF something which is more than a series of straight lines and curves on half a page of his celebrated treatise. Certainly he has provided the most mordant comment on the methodology of 'Quantitative economics' that any of its critics could possibly wish. (I, p. 103; II, p. 113) The language used here implies that deeply held beliefs are being threatened, as when he resorts to calling his fictitious Blank 'the wretched Blank' (III, p. 109).
Robbins' disdain for the empirical work of contemporaries appears to stem from a view that legitimate empirical generalizations are very easy to derive. Concerning Blank's estimate that the demand for herring was 1.3 in 1907, he observed that 'rough computations of this sort are not really very difficult' (I, p. 108). To perform more complicated calculations, adjusting for factors such as seasonal variations, is 'doctoring' the data (I, p. 99). Referring to the psychological probabilities that may profitably be taken into account in discussing monetary economics, he writes: 'No doubt the kind of insight required into these problems is often of a very elementary orderFalthough it is surprising how many people lack it. No doubt most of the probabilities involved are virtual certainties. Men in possession of their senses are not likely to question them as working maxims of political practice' (I, p. 130).
What comes across from Robbins' chapter is someone for whom the cardinal sin is to question the assumption of rational maximizing behaviour under conditions of scarcity. It would have been logically possible, and consistent with his arguments, to argue that, in the same way that the applicability of theory had to be tested, economic generalizations might have limited usefulness, for short, or perhaps not so short, periods of time. His belief that there are no generalizations to be discovered was based on historical experience (though applying standards that were so rigorous as to be virtually impossible to meet); he never entertained the belief that better methods might uncover useful generalizations, even though it would have been entirely consistent for him to remain agnostic, considering the possibility an open empirical question. He would, presumably, have rejected wholeheartedly the idea of Harrod (1939) that though firms must be governed by the profit motive, there may be circumstances under which profit maximization is not meaningful, opening up the possibility for an inductive element that goes beyond attaching numbers to parameters of economic theory. Going down that route would have opened up the 'institutionalist' can of worms that he was trying to keep firmly closed. The idea that averaging data might remove noise, allowing the economist to identify relationships, appears not to have been entertained, due to his scepticism about whether averages or averages of averages could be subject to any regularities. Simple back-of-the-envelope calculations were all that the economist needed to establish rough values for important coefficients.
II. ROBBINS AND STATISTICAL METHODS
The arguments discussed in the previous section concern the principles underlying the relation between theory and evidence. However, Robbins also made observations that bear on the use of methods based on mathematical statistics. Robbins is explicit in arguing that the assumptions needed to apply formal statistical methods to economic phenomena are untenable:
But a moment's reflection should make it plain that we are here entering upon a field of investigation where there is no reason to suppose that uniformities are to be discovered. The 'causes' which bring it about that are ultimate valuations prevailing at any moment are what they are, are heterogeneous in nature: there is no ground for supposing that the resultant effects should exhibit significant uniformity over time and space. No doubt there is a sense in which it can be argued that every random sample of the universe is the result of determinate causes. But there is no reason to believe that the study of a random sample of random samples is likely to yield generalizations of any significance.
(III, p. 107)
The theory of probability on which modern mathematical statistics is based affords no justification for averaging where conditions are obviously not such as to warrant the belief that homogeneous causes of different kinds are operating. (III, p. 113) In contemporary language, Robbins is arguing against any form of stationarity in economic data. By this, we mean that he is rejecting the existence of time-invariant parameters that may be recovered from repeated observations. In making this claim, Robbins is not only rejecting the applicability of laws of large numbers to economic data, he is rejecting the existence of invariant objects of interest. There may be universal relationships derived from economic theory, but these are not quantitative and so are not amenable to statistical treatment. While his argument need not be restricted to time series data, this seems to be the primary context in which he is thinking, given his dismissal of business cycle measurement of the type done by Mitchell.
When viewed from the standpoint of modern econometrics, Robbins' arguments suffer from two conceptual problems. First, he is not clear about what it means to say that a parameter is or is not invariant. One aspect of this lack of clarity concerns the time horizons over which empirical work is conducted. It is one thing to argue that a parameter evolves over time; it is quite different to argue that the variability occurs at a frequency such that time series analysis is impossible. He fails to explain why the question of whether parameters are sufficiently stable for analysis is not an empirical one. Even within his own terms, he fails to provide any reason why parameter evolution is so rapid that the assumption of invariance over some fixed horizon is untenable. It would be inconsistent for him to assume this as an inductive generalization.
Further, Robbins is not sensitive to the possibility that for a given formal model, parameters are or are not invariant depending on perspective. In hierarchical models, a common method of Bayesian modelling, one thinks of the parameters for each unit, measured either cross-sectionally or intertemporally, as drawn from a distribution; this distribution is in turn assumed to have invariant parameters (called hyperparameters).
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In frequentist contexts, there exist random coefficient models in which actor-specific parameters are treated as drawn from a common distribution. Interestingly, random coefficients models have undergone something of a renaissance in modern empirical work: the popular Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) model in industrial organization is a random coefficients version of the classical multinomial logit model. For both the Bayesian and frequentist contexts, what matters for our discussion is that the notion of an invariant parameter may be defined at different levels. Robbins might object to this way of understating parameter variability and simply claim that there do not exist any invariant parameters, hyper-or otherwise.
12 But a broad assertion of this type is never justified in Robbins' Essay and does not logically follow from his discussion.
Even if one concedes Robbins' view that there do not exist invariant parameters, a second issue arises, which is that there exist flexible tools to identify parameter shifts. One example is the identification of trend breaks in time series; modern treatments allow for the identification of multiple breaks in real time (e.g. Bai 1997 ). This time series work echoes a longstanding literature in statistics on detection of parameter changes; see Siegmund (1985) . Another example, admittedly one that has not been popular among empiricists, is Priestley's (1965) work on evolutionary spectra. The idea of this work is to allow the spectral density of a time series to change over time. Priestley develops an argument that there is a fundamental informational limit to the study of time series, in that the greater the allowed evolution, the less precise the estimates of the spectral density at a point in time. This trade-off is much in the spirit of Robbins' concerns, but indicates how Robbins' claims are overstated. A third example occurs outside the time domain. Empirical Bayes methods, originated by Robbins (1955) , allow a researcher to estimate the density that characterizes parameter heterogeneity nonparametrically, albeit at the cost of other assumptions.
Robbins implicitly makes a second criticism of econometrics in his treatment of technological change as an exemplar of a phenomenon of immense importance to economics that is not amenable to econometric analysis:
What technique of analysis could predict the trends of inventions leading on the one hand to the coming of the railway, on the other to the internal combustion engine? Even if we think that, if we know the technique, we can predict the type of economic relationship associated with it, which is of course highly disputable, how can we predict the technique? (III, The technology example is in some respects a strong one for Robbins' case against econometrics. The reason for it is that Robbins, in focusing on innovation, has identified a class of problems for which statistical analysis is particularly ill-suited. This is so because technology is an example of a non-ergodic process.
13 These processes can have the property that their time series realizations do not visit all of the intervals of potential values of the process. In the context of technology this means that individual technical changes derive from existing technologies in a way such that some sequences of potential technologies are never observed. The example most commonly used to illustrate this is the QWERTY versus the Dvorak typewriter keyboard (cf. the debate between David (1985) and Liebowitz and Margolis (1990) ). However, while the QWERTY debate has to do with whether one keyboard is more efficient than another and whether network externalities are sufficient to allow a relatively inefficient technology to be locked in, our point has to do with the path-dependence of the technologies themselves: that not all possible technologies will be observed. This failure to observe all possible technologies means that the full set of properties of the stochastic process underlying the observed sequence of technologies is not necessarily identifiable from available data. From the perspective of forecasting, the problem is that new technologies are novel, so it is unclear how one can conceptualize them prior to their existence. This is a deeper problem than simply saying that there is sufficient dependence in a data series to invalidate the law of large numbers.
Nevertheless, the technology case also illustrates a serious lacuna in Robbins' reasoning about empirical work. It is one thing to say that particular technological innovations cannot be predicted using econometrics; but this does not mean that one cannot say anything about technical change. Robbins is guilty of a category error in the sense that he conflates a property of individual technologies with their aggregation. Forecasting the effects of productivity growth on aggregate output does not require any ability to forecast the evolution of particular technologies, but rather requires some notion of an average effect across technologies. Concretely, the evaluation of the Solow residual does not take a stance on which particular innovations have occurred; what matters is their mean effect on aggregate growth. Notice that this issue does not require one to take a stance on how aggregate output is measured; the point holds for any rule. Robbins' example fails to address the appropriate level of aggregation for the analysis. Limits to the predictability of technology at the microeconomic level do not translate into the same limits at the macroeconomic level. By analogy, while one cannot predict the fertility decisions of a given family with much accuracy, one can predict aggregate birth trends quite accurately, at least over short horizons.
One possible response on Robbins' part would be that aggregate phenomena such as the Industrial Revolution are similarly unpredictable to changes in individual technologies. But such a response raises the question of the frequency of such events relative to the data available for analysis. We are not aware of any economist who believes that quantitative features of the Industrial Revolution would have been predictable in 1700 even with modern methods; even Oded Galor's work on unified growth theory, surveyed in Galor (2005) , which provides the most elaborate conceptual framework yet developed for very long-term growth behaviour, makes no quantitative predictions of this type.
III. ROBBINS' EMPIRICAL CLAIMS
While Robbins is critical of the ability of statistical methods to elucidate economics, he nevertheless makes a number of empirical claims in his Essay, the two most significant being the effects of a minimum wage and the quantity theory of money.
Robbins makes a very strong empirical claim concerning the effects of a minimum wage. He argues that the standard partial equilibrium result that a minimum wage will increase unemployment is empirically true and important in understanding post First World War unemployment in the United Kingdom:
It is a well-known generalization of theoretical Economics that a wage which is held above the equilibrium level necessarily involves unemployment and a diminution of the value of capital. This is one of the most elementary deductions from the theory of economic equilibrium. The history of this country since the War is one long vindication of its accuracy. (II, p. 146) To a modern observer, this is a remarkably strong statement in light of the weakness of the empirical evidence that Robbins presents. His main citation is Benham's (1931) evidence that minimum wages in practice cause unemployment. Benham's work amounts to little more than demonstrating that there is a high correlation between the ratio of wages to labour productivity and the unemployment rate. He made use of some interindustry comparisons as well as time series data, but there were not even the attempts at identifying natural experiments such as economists began to undertake in the 1940s. However, the main point is that attaching significance to this correlation undermines Robbins' belief that there are no significant empirical regularities. His second source was John Hicks' The Theory of Wages (1932), which does not contain any original empirical work on the question, although it does develop a number of theoretical arguments on why a link between unemployment and the minimum wage is empirically likely.
If economic theory pointed unequivocally towards the conclusion that a minimum wage must raise unemployment, it would be possible to conclude that Robbins' use of the data was redundant. However, this was not the case. As well as Hicks, Joan Robinson (1933) , in a book praised by Robbins (II, p. 77) , had shown that conclusions derived from perfect competition would not apply if labour markets were monopsonistic. Hicks (1932, p. 84) argued that monopsony was unlikely to be a serious problem for two reasons. Good communications meant that labour would move away from occupations where monopsonist employers kept wages low. In addition, if monopsony in the labour market were accompanied by monopoly in the product market, then a firm would find it hard to defend itself against potential competition. From the vantage of point of modern labour economics, this confidence that monopsony would not be a problem does not look persuasive. The modern theory of equilibrium wage dispersion associated with information imperfections and search provides a rebuttal of Hicks' presumptions: Manning (2003) in fact argues that monospony is relatively common in low-wage labour markets. The modern economics of information and the idea of an efficiency wage also work against Hicks' conclusions. As demonstrated, for example, in Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) , minimum wages can be Pareto-improving when firms cannot fully monitor workers' effort. The point is not that Robbins failed to anticipate these modern developments, but that he was making claims where theory was much less strong than he suggested, and that, even on the basis of theory available to him, required empirical evidence.
More interestingly, the effect of a minimum wage on unemployment is a proposition that, from the vantage point of modern empirical practice, is both testable in principle and questionable in fact. The proposition is testable in principle in the sense that one can consider minimum wage legislation as a treatment effect. Consider a set of political units, for example American states, some of which implement minimum wage legislation and others of which do not. If the implementation (or not) of the minimum wage were purely random, then the minimum wage legislation would mimic an experiment in which some patients receive a drug and others do not. David Card and Alan Krueger (1994) in essence use this approach in concluding that claims about the unemployment effects of minimum wages are at best of second-order significance. One can, of course, question whether the randomization assumptions needed to interpret the Card and Krueger findings are valid; this is one way to understand questions raised in Kennan (1995 Kennan ( , p. 1958 14 But this constitutes an issue very different from those raised by Robbins.
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Robbins' second major empirical claim concerns the quantity theory of money:
There can be no question that a quite elementary knowledge of the Quantity Theory was of immense prognostic value during the War and the disturbances which followed. (III, p. 125) He argues that evidence that the quantity theory does not hold may be dismissed because the theory is a ceteris paribus one:
According to pure monetary theory, if the quantity of money in circulation is increased and other things remain the same, the value of money must fall. This proposition is deducible from the most elementary facts of experience of the science, and its truth is independent of further inductive test.
(III, p. 117)
From the vantage point of modern research, Robbins' empirical claim is again problematic. One reason for this is that there exist time series methods that can evaluate the empirical implications of the quantity theory from a vantage point that is robust to many aspects of the details of the specification of the relationship between money and prices, and so survive the ceteris paribus caveat. Specifically, one can evaluate the quantity theory via the cointegration (or lack thereof) of money and prices, either in levels or in growth rates. Engle and Granger's classic 1987 Econometrica paper specifically argues that a weak implication of the quantity theory is that money growth and inflation are cointegrated. The empirical literature has not established cointegration of the series as an empirical fact, despite many analyses. Robbins could simply say that this proves nothing, in that the quantity theory still holds ceteris paribus; the absence of cointegration represents an additional factor, one that happens to have a unit root. This response is formally correct, but raises the question of what it means to say that the quantity theory is valid, since this additional factor in essence allows for infinite variation in either money growth or inflation that is not associated with commensurate variation in the other. See Hoover et al. (2008) for a general discussion of how cointegration may be used to rule out particular theories.
A second robust way of empirically evaluating the quantity theory follows from Sargent's (1983 Sargent's ( , 1992 ) work on the end of hyperinflations. Hyperinflations are a uniquely strong source of evidence on the quantity theory because they are cases where any violations of ceteris paribus conditions for the theory are second-order because money growth is explosive. Sargent's work shows that a key feature of the end of hyperinflations is the backing of the currency, as opposed to the level of the money supply per se. In particular, Sargent shows that the German and other post First World War European hyperinflations abated despite continuing high rates of money supply growth. While Robbins could presumably argue that Sargent's findings are consistent with his formulation of the quantity theory, since his claim assumed that 'other things remain the same', it is again not clear what content Robbins would give to the notion of the quantity theory in light of Sargent's findings.
Further, there exist sensible theories of the relationship between the money supply and price level that embody economic logic that moves beyond the quantity theory. Sargent and Wallace (1981) show how the government's intertemporal budget constraint, which determines the joint supply of government bonds and money, can break the proportionality of the money supply and price level in very complex ways. This type of reasoning is more recently manifested in work on the fiscal theory of the price level, well described in Kocherlakota and Phelan (1998) . Robbins is, of course, aware of the importance of accounting for the endogenity of the money supply with respect to the interactions of the central bank and the private financial sector, arguing that this is important in understanding the quantity theory:
The failure of the Currency School to secure permanent acceptance for their theory of Banking and the Exchanges, in other respects so greatly superior to that of their opponents, was notoriously due to their failure to perceive the importance of including Bank Credit in their concept of money.
( III, p. 117) But this comment at best refers to the real bills doctrine and the distinction between inside and outside money (one emphasized by Sargent in relating the end of hyperinflations to the quantity theory) and not the intertemporal government budget constraint per se.
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The minimum wage and quantity theory examples have two factors in common. First, each is testable under weak assumptions, something that has been understood only in the last 25 years. Second, each is less closely linked to economic theory than Robbins suggests, especially from the vantage point of modern economic theory. However, Robbins employs them in different ways. The minimum wage shows Robbins relying primarily on a regularity, of a type whose existence he denies, to establish that a theoretical result is applicable. The quantity theory shows him relying on a theoretical result that, even if it were correct, is unusable without quantification at least of the time frame over which it operates. The latter is in principle consistent with his views on the use of statistical evidence to establish whether the results of economic theory are applicable in a given situation, though one might wonder whether how much is contributed by the theory.
IV. ROBBINS AND MODERN DEBATES IN ECONOMICS
While Robbins' broad empirical claims might not survive scrutiny from the vantage point of modern economics, this does not imply that his claims with respect to the limits of econometrics do not apply to some domains. In terms of contemporary research, a number of Robbins' themes may be identified, even though one does not usually find wholesale parallels to his thinking. Robbins' views on the primacy of economic theory are mirrored in the calibration approach to macroeconomics.
17 Kydland and Prescott (1996) describe calibration (which they refer to as a computational experiment) in these terms:
One immediate question arises is whether the computation experiment should be regarded as an econometric tool . . . In the modern (narrow) sense of the term it is not . . . since it isn't used. Yet it is an econometric tool in the original (broad) sense of the term (which we prefer), since quantitative experiments are used to derive the quantitative implications of economic theory. (Kydland and Prescott 1996, p. 70) The key difference between Kydland and Prescott and Robbins is that while each assigns primacy to a given body of economic theory, Kydland and Prescott (like Robert Lucas) take the quantitative implications of their theories seriously. The calibration approach accepts the existence of invariant parameters. These parameters, however, are not objects such as elasticities, which are statistical constructs, but rather primitives of the economy, parameters that describe tastes and technologyFexactly the same primitives as Robbins advocated. Kydland and Prescott (1991) explicitly argue that one of the reasons for the failure of the simultaneous equations approach to macroeconomic modelling, which they associate with Tjalling Koopmans, is the general recognition that policy-invariant behavioral equations are inconsistent with the maximization postulate in dynamic settings (Kydland and Prescott 1991, p. 167) further stating that:
The principal reason for the abandonment of the system-of-equations approach, however, was advances in neoclassical theory that permitted the application of the paradigm in stochastic settings. Once the neoclassical tools needed for modeling business cycle fluctuations existed, their application to this problem and their ultimate domination over any other method was inevitable. (Kydland and Prescott 1991, p. 167, emphasis added) While other scholars (e.g. the Austrian school) echo Robbins even more systematically, such critics are largely on the periphery of the discipline, whereas the KydlandPrescott approach is one of the dominant empirical strategies in macroeconomics, at least at present.
Why has the feature of Robbins' critique to which most attention has been paid, at least in terms of macroeconomic practice, been the primacy of theory over empirical work, rather than any of his other arguments? Robbins' claims about the non-existence of invariant parameters have not proven important because statistics and econometrics have demonstrated the capacity to address the problem, at least partially. To return to an earlier example, time series econometrics has developed a range of methods for allowing for parameter heterogeneity. The performance of these methods will, of course, depend on the nature of the heterogeneity. What these methods do is delimit the range of circumstances under which time series analysis is invalid; assessment of the extent to which the methods answer a Robbins-type critique will depend on the plausibility that one assigns to the circumstances. In contrast, Robbins' concerns about non-ergodicity have, at least for technology, not proven important, in that econometric studies of technology do not focus on specific innovations in the way needed to make the critique relevant.
In contrast, why does Robbins' view of the primacy of theory continue to appear in contemporary economic debates? From a purely statistical perspective, this would seem to be paradoxical, since all of Robbins' arguments may be reduced to the rejection of untestable assumptions that are needed to render econometric inference interpretable without placing any comparable requirements on the criteria used to determine that some economic theory is 'true'. But this suggests a possible resolution of the paradox: economists naturally have much stronger prior beliefs about substantive economic claims than about purely statistical ones. The assumptions needed for the estimation of an evolving spectral density do not directly translate into propositions about the economy.
Beyond this, the ceteris paribus nature of economic theories, combined with their qualitative nature (by which we mean the sense in which theories do not speak to functional forms, lag lengths, etc.), means that alternative substantive theories are typically not identified. In the absence of identification, the data cannot speak for themselves in terms of the validity or lack thereof of a given theory, and so the adjustment of substantive beliefs about the economy to data will be attenuated by the strength of a researcher's prior views. Heckman (2000) argues that the study of the identification problem is the hallmark of what makes econometrics different from statistics.
18 According to Heckman:
Most econometric theory adapts methods originating in statistics. The major exception to this rule is the econometric analysis of the identification problem and the companion analysis of structural equations, causality, and economic policy evaluation. Although an economist did not invent the phrase 'correlation does not imply causation,' economists clarified the meaning of causation within well-specified models, the requirement for causal interpretation of an empirical relationship and the reasons why a causal framework is necessary for evaluating economic policies. (Heckman 2000, p. 49) He goes on to claim that:
An important contribution of econometric thought was the formalization of the notion developed in philosophy that many different theoretical models and hence many different causal interpretations may be consistent with the same data . . . The key insight in the literature of twentieth century econometrics was the discovery of the conditional nature of empirical knowledge. The justification for interpreting an empirical association causally hinges on the assumptions required to identify the causal parameters from the data. (Heckman 2000, p. 47) Heckman's thinking can perhaps be interpreted in the following manner. As noted in Backhouse (1997, p. 161) , the Duhem-Quine thesis on underdetermination of knowledge is, in the context of economics, the identification problem. Quine regarded the thesis not as undermining the legitimacy of science, but rather as providing an appropriate framework for understanding how scientific knowledge evolves, via an adjustment of the many hypotheses which collectively are employed to construct a world view; Quine refers to this as the 'web of belief' (Quine and Ullian 1978) . 19 In economics, the parallel idea, following Heckman, is that economic knowledge derives from an interplay of empirical observations with identification assumptions. With respect to the primacy of theory, methodological differences between a Heckman and a Prescott are intimately connected to different resolutions of the identification problem. Heckman's views treat theory and empirics in a far more symmetric way than Prescott's.
The weakness of critiques of econometrics that stem from a Robbinsian view of the worldFcovering both the wholesale rejection by Austrians of formal empirical analysis as well as the more limited claims of Prescott and the calibrationist schoolFis that it is based on an excessively black-and-white view of the plausibility of assumptions. Econometric methods involve finding plausible control variables and statistical specifications (which together constitute an econometric model) so as to identify regularities that would otherwise be hidden due to the complexity of economic phenomena. Robbins is effectively arguing that there is no reason to regard one control variable or one specification as more plausible than another, and so regards any particular choice of an econometric model as arbitrary. Further, since one can usually imagine control variables for which observable analogues do not exist (and presumably statistical specifications that are not estimable given data limitations), holders of Robbins' view can always explain away statistical evidence that is inconsistent with a theory; this is most easily seen in how the invocation of a ceteris paribus condition can inoculate a given theory from any claims that observed data render it less plausible. 20 But this is a desiccated view of the scientific process. In fact, when applied to the physical and biological sciences, it is a short step to subjectivism and postmodern rejections of a privileged place for scientific knowledge over folk wisdom. The fact that identification problems require judgments does not mean that some judgments cannot be defended versus others. Robbins' error in essentially treating all econometric modelling assumptions as equally untenable is hardly unique. Nagel (1997), in his defence of scientific knowledge, identifies this as a primary mistake of subjectivists.
In addition, the designation of a primary place to 'economic theory' can lead to spurious claims of empirical validity. An interesting example of this concerns recent debates about the Great Depression and the New Deal. Cole and Ohanian (1999, 2004) argue that a real business cycle model can explain, very well, the depth and persistence of the Depression as the result of large total factor productivity shocks and price and wage distortions induced by the National Recovery Administration (NRA). Focusing on Cole and Ohanian (1999) , monetary factors are rejected (as are many other standard explanations) as explaining persistence of the Depression on the basis of a combination of casual empiricism (inspection of a few time series to see how they move relative to output) as well as elaborate calibration analysis of a real business cycle model whose only major friction is bilateral bargaining between firms and workers (to capture the NRA). These analyses do not provide a symmetric examination of alternative models of the Depression. 21 How is research of this type assessed? Kehoe and Prescott (2008) , whose (2007) edited volume contains a range of efforts to apply real business cycle models to depressions, make their case through calibrating a real business cycle model without the frictions associated with the NRA and then using this as a baseline to determine what is needed to understand the Depression. As they explain:
As Cole and Ohanian stress, this sort of exercise, which takes the behavior of productivity as exogenous, does not provide a fully satisfactory theory of the US Great Depression. Nonetheless, we learn a lot from the exercise because it defines very precisely what a satisfactory theory needs to do. It needs to explain the sharp fall in productivity over the period [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] , and it needs to explain why hours fell so sharply from 1929 to 1933 and stayed so depressed afterward even though productivity recovered. A theory that cannot accomplish these tasks using a modified version of the model is not a successful theory in the context of the research agenda developed in Great Depressions of the Twentieth Century.
( Kehoe and Prescott 2008, p. 6) This defence is, we think, a very fair one, precisely because it indicates the limitations of the 'primacy of theory' approach. That approach ignores issues of observational or near observational equivalence between competing theories and further places empirical work in a subsidiary role whereby a particular paradigm is assumed to be correct, subject to adjustments in response to observed data patterns. This view of economics is very reminiscent of Robbins (1934) , who interpreted the Depression from an Austrian perspective. While this is far less sophisticated than Prescott and others in how data are marshalled to elucidate the theory, one sees the same effort to apply a general business cycle theory to an unprecedented event. In this sense, Robbins' primacy of theory fails to respect the (admittedly imprecisely defined) near non-ergodicity of the Depression.
Of course, none of these criticisms of Robbins and, by extension, his successors provides a precise formula for achieving progress in economic knowledge. Robbins was right in saying that theory is needed to draw conclusions from statistical data and simple induction is not enough. It is equally clear that naive falsificationism is not possible either.
22 But this does not support Robbins' position. The absence of any rigid formula that would guarantee success in empirical work is entirely consistent with there being constructive pragmatic strategies that are conducive to progress in economic knowledge (see Backhouse 1997) . It is further possible to consider how the organization of scientific research allows for progress in the face of underdetermination (Kitcher 1993) . Insofar as these strategies enable judgments informed by data to challenge theoretical presuppositions, they may look much like falsificationist ideas that have fallen out of favour in both philosophy and economics.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Robbins cannot be blamed for failing to anticipate what has been achieved using the tools of modern econometrics. Even those who saw the potential of econometric work did so in hope rather than with a clear perception of what the future would hold. Given 886 ECONOMICA [OCTOBER what had actually been achieved in 1932 and the movements with which quantitative work was associated, Robbins' scepticism is, to a certain extent, understandable. However, he nonetheless held two views on empirical work that we now know to be profoundly mistaken and for which there was no justification, even by the standards of economic knowledge in the 1930s. The first of these was that, despite emphasizing the importance of statistics, he treated quantitative regularities as either ephemeral or permanent. In doing so, he ruled out the entire middle ground inhabited by econometrics: that of regularities that may be specific to a particular context, but are sufficiently stable for models built upon them to be usable for certain purposes. Second, and partly as a consequence of this, he considered that establishing quantitative regularities was an easy task. He seems not to have seen that naive methods might fail to establish regularities that more sophisticated techniques might reveal. While it would have been understandable for him to have had doubts about how, or even whether, such methods could ever be developed, one would have thought that someone who understood the importance of ceteris paribus clauses, as Robbins did, might have glimpsed this, even if he had not read the literature on identification that was making significant progress in the 1920s and 1930s (see Morgan 1990) . We might conclude that the weaknesses of Robbins' attack on empirical economics reflect the general problem of the Austrian view on this question and its modern instantiation in model calibration: a failure to adequately account for the constructive role that empirical analysis needs to play in the evolution of theory.
What might explain this? At one level the answer may lie in Robbins' antipathy towards Historicism and Institutionalism, and in what he saw as exaggerated claims for empirical work. Faced with this, it was important to defend theory. At another level, it appears that Robbins' argument may have involved a confusion as to the nature of theory, which he began to address in his second edition, but which he did not resolve. He recognized, following criticism by Hutchison (1935) , 23 that theory needed to contain empirical propositions if it were to have empirical content. However, he did not follow through the implications of accepting that statistical analysis might reveal 'auxiliary postulates', maintaining his view that the empirical basis for theory comprised only propositions that were obviously true. Thus, despite his endorsement of the idea that statistical analysis was important, and despite the apparent softening of his position towards theory in the second edition, his view of theory and the way he applied it to the Great Depression came close in practice to Misean a priorism. Our excursions into modern econometric work are relevant because they show the dangers of basing theory on propositions that seem 'obvious'. 24 Many propositions that theorists take to be axiomatic, are actually problematic. This attitude towards the status of theoretical propositions led Robbins to see a radical gulf between the certainty of various theoretical propositions and the ephemeral nature of propositions derived through statistical analysis. Modern econometrics is based on the premise that regularities exist with different degrees of stability, and that the issue of whether or not there exist usable regularities is one that needs to be resolved, using empirical analysis, in each specific case. If that terrain is ruled out, the only empirical methods that remain are those that use statistical methods simply to estimate, not to test. NOTES 1. It is true that the purely atheoretical approach in Sims' early work has moved towards theory via the development of structural vector autoregression analysis. However, this type of work still delimits the role of theory to the placing of restrictions on the correlation structure of innovations: the dynamics of the economic variables of interest are still analysed atheoretically. 2. Keynes illustrates the position of someone who shared Robbins' scepticism about the ability of econometric methods to solve problems of the cycle but whose objections to econometrics were, at least ostensibly, based on technical problems that, given the knowledge of the time, could not be solved. He considered Tinbergen's work impossibly ambitious and riven with what we would now see as technical flaws, but he conceded that econometric work might solve simpler problems. However, like Robbins, it is fair to say that the criteria by which he judged econometric work were more demanding than those he imposed on theory. In that sense he was vulnerable to some of the criticisms we make of Robbins. 3. See Morgan (1990) Hausman (1992) . 7. He did not so much as hint that his first edition might have fostered such a misconception. 8. Having been added since 1932, it is tempting to speculate that this reflects the appearance of the work of Hicks and Allen. However, this would not appear to be relevant for his point, in that he is saying that if preferences appear to have changed, it is still possible to find a deeper set of preferences that has not changed. 9. Given that he later confessed that his rejection of Keynesian economics had been a big intellectual error, it would be interesting to know whether it would have caused him to revise these views on the relation between equilibrium theory and data. 10. In later work (Robbins 1938) he cited Henry Schultz's studies of the elasticity of demand for sugar, criticizing him for using data spanning several decades. 11. See Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) for an overview of hierarchical linear models. 12. Although if so, it is not clear what Robbins means about primitives to describe objects such as those features of preferences that are immune to advertising. That said, his position is not logically inconsistent. 13. The technology literature often refers to technology as being path-dependent. Path-dependence does not possess a distinct formal definition beyond non-ergodicity as applied to a time series process; the term, as far as we know, does not appear in the statistics or mathematics literature at all and certainly does not appear as a concept distinct from non-ergodicity. 14. Card and Krueger's primary empirical work is based on a comparison of low-skilled jobs in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. They compare employment in these jobs before and after New Jersey implemented a minimum wage increase. They find that employment growth was negative in Pennsylvania while it was mildly positive in New Jersey. This approach is known as a difference in difference estimator as it compares the differences for two distinct units (in this case in US states). The random implementation assumption, as needed by Card and Krueger to interpret their findings as evidence against a minimum wage employment effect, is that the change in the New Jersey law is not predictable given any unobserved change in the economic conditions of the two states. Treatment effect interpretations of this type can account for the endogeneity of treatment choice; see Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a, b) for a definitive discussion of the assumptions needed. Much of the contemporaneous debate in microeconomics concerns which candidate sets of assumptions are most appropriate. 15. Card and Kruegers's (1994) findings remain controversial. A number of studies have concluded that minimum wage laws do reduce employment; Neumark and Wascher (1992) is one example that is approximately contemporaneous with Card and Krueger. Our argument is not that Robbins' claim has or has not proven to be correct, nor do we assert that the preponderance of empirical evidence is consistent with his view; rather, our claim is that his assumption does not warrant the certainty that Robbins assigns to it. 16. The real bills doctrine itself is resuscitated in Sargent and Wallace (1982) . 17. For a useful discussion of many of these issues, see Hoover (1995) . 18. See also Heckman (2005) . 19. Laudan (1996) criticizes Quine for failing to explicitly address whether in the presence of underdermination, alternative theories nevertheless can be rationally compared and chides Quine for 'appearing to assert the equi-rationality of all rival theoretical systems' (p. 34). We do not take a stand on this, though we do think it is clear that Quine rejects postmodern perspectives on science.
20. The existence of control variables and statistical specifications that cannot be evaluated given available data matters for Robbins' critique since it is possible to engage in econometric inference conditional on a model space rather than a particular model; there is a growing literature on model uncertainty that does precisely this. One way to proceed is model averaging, in which each model is assigned a probability of being the correct one, which may then be used to integrate out dependence of a statistical claim on a given model. This method is originally proposed by Leamer (1978) ; see Doppelhofer (2008) for a recent overview. There are also methods of drawing inferences on model spaces that avoid assignment of model probabilities, using a criterion such as minimax or minimax regret. These different approaches typically presuppose that the correct model lies in the space under consideration. 21. See Temin (2008) for a critique of analyses of this type that echoes a number of our arguments, and Kehoe and Prescott (2008) for a defence. 22. The utility of sophisticated versions of falsificationism in economics is discussed in Blaug (1992) and Backhouse (1997) . Blaug (1992, p. 18) provides an interpretation of Popper as an answer to the DuhemQuine thesis. 23. See Howson (2007) . 24. Modern economists, of course, have even less excuse than Robbins for treating the propositions of economic theory as obviously true.
